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FAMILY CONTROL AND EARNINGS QUALITY1
CONTROL FAMILIAR Y CALIDAD DEL RESULTADO
RESUMEN
El trabajo analiza la relación entre el control familiar y la calidad de la información contable
en un contexto en el que el tradicional conflicto de agencia entre directivos y accionistas se
desplaza a la divergencia de intereses entre accionistas controladores y minoritarios. Los
resultados alcanzados muestran que, en comparación con las no familiares, las empresas de
naturaleza familiar divulgan unos resultados de mayor calidad, tanto en términos de menores
ajustes por devengo discrecionales como de mayor capacidad de los componentes actuales del
resultado para predecir los cash flows futuros. Además, el aumento en los derechos de voto en
manos de la familia controladora incrementa la calidad de los resultados contables. La evidencia
obtenida se muestra consistente con la presencia de un efecto reputación/vinculación a largo
plazo asociado a la empresa familiar. Adicionalmente, el trabajo refleja que a medida que
disminuye la divergencia entre los derechos de voto y de cash flow en manos de la familia
controladora, aumenta la calidad de la información contable.
PALABRAS CLAVE: derechos de voto, divergencia, empresa familiar, calidad del
resultado, reputación, beneficios privados.
JEL: G-11, M-14.
ABSTRACT
This work examines the relationship between family control and earnings quality in a context
where the salient agency problem shifts away from the classical divergence between managers
and shareholders to conflicts between the controlling owner and minority shareholders. The
results reveal that, compared to non-family firms, family firms reveal higher earnings quality
in terms of both lower discretionary accruals and greater predictability of future cash flows.
They also show a positive relationship between the level of voting rights held by the
controlling family and earnings quality. The evidence is consistent with the presence of a
reputation/long-term involvement effect associated with the family firm. Moreover, the work
reflects that, as the divergence between the voting and cash flow rights in the hands of the
controlling family decreases, earnings quality increases.
KEY WORDS: voting rights, divergence, family firms, earnings quality, private benefits.
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INTRODUCTION
The objective of this work is to analyse the relationship between family control and
earnings quality in a context where the traditional agency conflict between managers and
shareholders is replaced by the divergence of the interests between controlling and
minority shareholders. In that respect, in Anglo-Saxon countries, where outside investors
are well-protected and the level of transparency is high, most listed firms present widely-
held ownership structures. In this setting, the main agency conflict stems from the
divergence of the interests between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling,
1976). However, the ownership structure of listed Spanish firms, as in most countries of
continental Europe, is characterised by high levels of concentrated ownership, by the use
of pyramid structures that enable controlling shareholders to separate their voting and
cash flow rights, and by the notable presence of family groups among such owners (e.g., La
Porta et al., 1999; Faccio and Lang, 2002). Moreover, the control exerted by these family
owners is not usually limited solely to their participation in the firm’s ownership since they
usually play an active role in management (La Porta et al., 1999). In that regard, a lower
separation between ownership and control shifts the main agency conflict to the possible
expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling owners (e.g., La Porta et al., 2000;
Faccio et al., 2001 and Burkart et al., 2003). 
Thus, drawing on the literature to date, it is possible to address the relationship between
family control and earnings quality from two opposing approaches. On the one hand, the
highly concentrated ownership that usually characterises the family firm could lead the
controlling family to use its position of power to take actions aimed at obtaining private
benefits that could harm the interests of minority shareholders (e.g., Morck et al., 1988; La
Porta et al., 2000;  Fan and Wong, 2002; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). This mainly occurs
in a setting like Spain, where the interests of minority shareholders are poorly protected by
the legal system. Furthermore, this expropriation of the minority shareholders’ wealth could
be exacerbated by the presence of pyramid structures that allow controlling owners to
commit low equity investment while maintaining tight control of the firm (e.g., Bebchuck,
1999; Fan and Wong, 2002). This kind of structure allows the controlling shareholders to
escape the pro rata consequences of their decisions by creating a material difference
between cash flow rights and voting rights (Francis et al., 2005). Therefore, the desire to
prevent greater scrutiny and so avoid possible sanctions derived from the detection of this
behaviour could create incentives to alter the reported earnings (Warfield et al., 1995). This
leads the controlling family to report accounting information out of self-interest rather than
as a reflection of the firm’s underlying economic transactions. 
Nevertheless, it could be pointed out that certain distinctive characteristics of the family
firm, such as its long-investment horizons and its reputation concerns (Anderson and Reeb,
2003) would mean that the owners consider the firm as an asset to be passed on to their
1
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descendants rather than wealth to be consumed during their lifetimes. Therefore, it could
be argued that, compared with non-family, controlling family firms would tend to maximize
the firm’s wealth in the long term. Thus, there would be fewer incentives to obtain private
benefits at the expense of minority shareholders, which in turn could result in higher
earnings quality. In this sense, Wang (2006) and Ali et al. (2007) reveal a positive
relationship between family ownership and earnings quality in a sample of U.S. firms.
However, those authors also point out that one of the main limitations of their work is the
difficulty to extend their results to other settings where there is a lower protection of
minority shareholders, and consequently, more concentrated ownership structures. 
In that respect and despite the significant proportion of capital that family owners manage
in Europe, empirical evidence on the behaviour of family firms remains sparse (Maury,
2006). Therefore, this work analyses the impact of family control on earnings quality in a
setting where the main agency problem stems from the conflict of controlling and minority
shareholders’ interests. In pursuit of that objective, we used a sample of Spanish firms
listed in the period 1997-2003, as well as different measures of earnings quality such as
the discretionary accruals and the predictability of cash flows.
This study extends previous research in several ways. Firstly, it contributes to the current
debate on the importance of corporate governance mechanisms and particularly, ownership
structure, as determinants of earnings quality. In this respect, it should be pointed out that
the Spanish context offers the opportunity to undertake the study in a setting other than
that considered in previous literature (e.g., Wang, 2006; Ali et al., 2007), since most listed
firms in Spain, whether family firms or not, have concentrated ownership structures, which
entails fewer demands for earnings quality (Ball et al., 2003). Thus, in such a setting, the
decision on the type of information disclosed and the way in which it should be
communicated to third parties is to a great extent, conditional upon the controlling
shareholders’ utility function.
Secondly, this work uses the control chain methodology proposed by La Porta et al. (1999),
Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) to analyse ownership structure. The
consideration of immediate ownership to analyse how control is exercised in an institutional
setting in which complex ownership structures are used, as is the case in Continental
Europe (e.g., La Porta, et al., 1999; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Haw, et al., 2004), could lead
to a dual error. On the one hand, a shareholder might be assigned a level of participation
that does not match with the real one, and on the other hand, an agent who is not in the
ultimate position of ownership might be identified as a shareholder with the ability to
control. Furthermore, this methodology permits the analysis of the impact of the divergence
between voting and cash flow rights in the hands of the controlling shareholder on earnings
quality, an issue that has not been addressed in previous literature in the family business
context. Moreover, since the control exercised by family owners is not usually limited to
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mere participation in ownership, with such owners generally playing an active role in
management (La Porta et al., 1999), this work classifies a company as a family firm if the
ultimate owner is a family or an individual whose rights are also represented on the board.
This constitutes a notable difference in relation to previous works (e.g., Wang, 2006; Ali, et
al., 2007) since, as Hutton (2007) indicates, the consideration of a firm as a family one in
cases where the founder is an emeritus member of the board, or when the family does not
hold a significant participation in the ownership is debatable.
The rest of the work is structured as follows. The second section addresses the theoretical
approaches that justify the effect of family control on earnings quality. The third section
describes the methodological issues of the empirical study. The results obtained are
presented in Section 4 while the main conclusions of work are set out in the final section.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND HYPOTHESES
Unlike firms in the Anglo-Saxon context, most firms in Continental Europe have
concentrated ownership structures in which control is held by one, or very few, controlling
shareholders (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; Faccio and Lang, 2002). One of the factors that
may explain the difference in ownership structures is the level of protection of minority
shareholders2 by the legal system. In this sense, Bebchuk (1999) suggests a greater
presence of widely-held ownership structures in countries where the wealth of minority
shareholders is well protected by the legal system (i.e., the United States, the United
Kingdom). In that respect, Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) argue that, when there is stronger
investor protection, capital markets are more developed and there is less ownership
concentration. These theoretical arguments are in line with the empirical results obtained
by La Porta et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002). 
Thus, ownership structure shapes the salient agency conflict in a specific institutional
setting. In that regard, the presence of concentrated ownership shifts the classic agency
problem away from the divergence of interests between managers and shareholders (e.g.,
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983) to conficts between
controlling and minority shareholders (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al.,
2000). The origin of this conflict can be found in the controlling shareholders’ tendency to
use their power to undertake activities aimed at obtaining private benefits that harm the
minority shareholders’ wealth. In addition, the presence of concentrated ownership is
usually associated with the use of structures that permit the controlling shareholders to
2
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(2) La Porta et al. (1998) analyze at an international setting the level of protection provided to external
investors by the legal system. They distinguish two types of origins or legal families: common law, whose
origins lie in Anglo-Saxon law, and civil law, based on the principles established by Roman law. Three
families are observed in the latter: the French (including Spain), the German and the Scandinavian. This
study reveals a higher level of protection in countries with legal systems of Anglo-Saxon origin, while civil
law countries provide less protection, with the weakest protection of external investors found in legislations
of French origin.
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separate voting and cash flow rights (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; Francis et al., 2005). This
kind of structure allows the controlling shareholders to escape the pro rata consequences
of their decisions by creating a material difference between their cash flow rights and
voting rights (Francis et al., 2005) all of which might exacerbate their tendency towards
expropriation (e.g., Morck et al., 1998; Claessens et al., 2000; Bebchuck et al., 2000;
Faccio et al., 2001). Moreover, in countries like Spain, this incentive to obtain private
benefits at the expense of minority shareholders might be accentuated since, unlike what
occurs in Anglo-Saxon countries, the interests of minority shareholders are poorly
protected by the legal system.
According to previous arguments, it could be argued that the greater concentration of
voting rights could entail greater incentives for controlling shareholders to obtain private
benefits. Furthermore, this trend could increase in the case of  family firms since these
private benefits remain with the controlling family whereas, in the case of firms whose
ultimate owner is not a family (i.e., institutional), they are distributed among a great
number of shareholders (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). 
In that respect, some works have provided evidence on the expropriatory actions carried
out by family groups. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2000) illustrate how the controlling family
of a large American firm cut dividends to minority shareholders while paying itself a
special dividend. Similarly, drawing on data based on the entire population of Spanish
newspapers Gómez et al. (2001) analyse the role that family relations play in agency
contracts and provide evidence of the entrenchment of the Chairman of the board when
he/she has family ties with the controlling shareholders. In those circumstances,
controlling shareholders would have incentives to alter the accounting information in order
to avoid the costs associated with the detection of this kind of behaviour (e.g., Fan and
Wong, 2002; Haw et al. 2004; Francis et al., 2005; Santana et al. 2007). In that respect,
Fan and Wong (2002) states that, when an owner effectively controls a firm, he/she also
controls the production of the firm’s accounting information and reporting policies.
Therefore, based on the above arguments, one might predict that family control has a
negative influence on earnings quality. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis:
Ha: Family control has a negative and significant effect on earnings quality.
However, another body of recent works has shown how certain distinctive characteristics
of the family firm have a positive impact on corporate behaviour. More specifically, in their
study of a sample of 500 North American firms between 1992 and 1999, Anderson et al.
(2003) reveal that family firms achieve higher levels of performance than non-family firms.
That result would be justified by certain characteristics associated with the family nature
of the firm, such as as its long-investment horizons and its reputation concerns. In this
sense, compared with other types of owner, families are interested in remaining in the firm
Family control and earnings quality
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over a long period of time, so they are more prone to make investments that maximize value
in the long term (e.g., Stein, 1988; James, 1999; Casson, 1999; Chami, 2001; Anderson et
al., 2003). Thus, a family owner would tend to have incentives to follow market rules when
making decisions since the firm is not considered a resource to be consumed during the
owner’s lifetime, but rather an asset to be transferred to his/her heirs in the future.
Therefore, the firm’s survival becomes a “family matter” in this type of enterprise.
Furthermore, Anderson et al. (2003) suggest that the long-term ties typical of the family
owner mean that external agents, such as suppliers or lenders, develop their businesses
with the controlling family over a long period of time. This leads to those external agents
perceiving a “family reputation” that has economic consequences that last not only for the
founder’s lifetime, but throughout the lives of his/her heirs. 
On the same lines, Wang (2006) states that long-term orientation and reputation concerns
means that family firms do not act opportunistically in reporting earnings since such
actions are more in line with a short-term orientation. That author uses those arguments to
offer possible explanations for the results obtained in his study using a sample of US firms
and concludes that family firms provide better earnings quality than non-family firms. Ali
et al. (2007) obtain similar results using alternative measures of earnings quality. 
Based on these arguments, the distinctive characteristics of the family firm, such as concern
for long-term survival or reputation, could result in a positive relationship between family
control and earnings quality. Therefore, we propose an alternative hypothesis:
Hb: Family control has a positive and significant effect on earnings quality.
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
3.1. - Definition of the family firm
The works that examine the relationship between ownership structure and earnings quality
have mainly focused on immediate ownership (e.g., Carlson and Bathala, 1997; Chen and
Jaggi, 2000; Chan and Gray, 2002; Gabrielsen et al., 2002; Jung and Kwon, 2002; Chalmers
and Godfrey, 2004). However, in the case of complex ownership structures, which are
common in continental Europe, the use of immediate ownership does not accurately capture
how the control of a firm is exercised (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; Faccio and Lang, 2002;
Haw et al., 2004). In this work we use the control chain methodology  proposed by La Porta
et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002). Thus, we consider a firm
with an ultimate owner as a company where the principal shareholder directly or indirectly
owns a percentage of voting rights that is equal to or above an established level of control,
which in the case of those authors is 10% or 20%. In our case, the minimum cut-off level
3
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(3) However, we undertook an empirical study using 20% of the voting rights as the minimum cut-off level and
the results remained unchanged.
(4) For a review of the definitions of family firm in the literature, consult the work of Cabrera and García (1999).
is 10%. In that respect, La Porta et al. (1999) cites two reasons for the use of this
percentage. Firstly, it is a significant level of voting rights, and secondly, firms in most
countries are legally required to provide the market with information about the identity of
shareholders holding 10% (or more) of the voting rights. However, although in 75% of the
firms with an ultimate owner the level of that shareholder’s voting rights exceeds 20%, the
use of a 10% cut-off level best suits the Spanish context3. La Porta et al. (1999), Claessens
et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) consider that when the ultimate owner is either
an individual or a family, the firm can be considered a family firm. This definition of a
family firm has a clear advantage since it permits to attribute the company´s decisions to
the controlling family. In this sense, Hutton (2007) indicates that the definition used by Ali
et al. (2007), which considers a family firm as “any firm whose founders or descendants
continue to hold positions in the top management or on the board, or are among the
company´s largest shareholders” remains open to debate. Thus, according to this definition,
a firm may be considered as a family one even under the assumption that a descendant of
the founder holds a top management post but does not have any participation in the capital
and so has no control over corporate decisions. The same disadvantages can be attributed
to Wang’s (2006) definition of family firms4, as it refers to firms with substantial common
stock held by family members or with founding family members actively involved in the
management or the board of directors”. Therefore, with the aim of ensuring that effective
control of the decisions falls on the family, we have also added to the definition by La Porta
et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) the requirement that the
family’s ownership is represented on the board. 
By way of example, if a family is the main shareholder of firm A, with 26% of its voting
rights, and if firm A is the main shareholder of firm B, with 32% of the voting rights, we
can state that firm B is controlled by the family with a level of control of 26%. This
percentage would correspond to the weakest link in the control chain [min. (0.26; 0.32)],
where the family is the ultimate owner by indirectly controlling firm B through firm A.
Moreover, in this example, the family holds 8.32% of firm B’s cash flow rights (the product
of its holdings along the chain, 0.26x0.32). Thus, pyramid structures emerge when there
is an ultimate owner that indirectly controls one firm through a participation in another
firm. It can be seen that this kind of structures allow for the divergence between the
ultimate owner´s voting and cash flow rights. If we consider that the family possesses
100% of firm A’s voting rights, no divergence exists between voting and cash flow rights,
since both rights amount to a percentage of 32%. On occasions, we find that a firm is
controlled through a multiple control chain, that is, when the ultimate owner controls the
firm via several control chains. Thus, if in the previous example the family directly owns
6% of firm B’s voting rights, then this family holds 14,32% of the cash flow rights of firm
B (0.26x0.32 + 0.06), and 32% of its voting rights, that is [min. (0.26; 0.32) + 0.06]. 
Family control and earnings quality
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To determine the control chain using the previously explained methodology, the first step
was to obtain information about large holdings from the National Stock Exchange
Commission (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores). From that information, we
obtained the direct and indirect holdings of shareholders with more than 5% of shares, as
well as the equity in the hands of directors irrespective of the size of the holding. The next
step was to complement that source with the Informa database, which offered information
on the ownership and the boards of directors of listed and unlisted Spanish firms. Those
data were necessary to draw the firm´s entire control chain (that is, to identify the ultimate
owner). In the case of a firm not being registered in Spain, we completed its ownership
structure from the annual reports posted on the firm’s website and when necessary we
resolved any queries by e-mail.
Figure 1 shows the control chain of Sol Meliá on the 31st December 2006. We can see that
Gabriel Escarrer Juliá is the company´s ultimate owner exercising his control through a
pyramidal structure that enables him to hold 60.89% of the voting rights as opposed to
45.92% of the cash flow rights. Moreover, the voting rights of this ultimate owner are
represented on the board. This firm, which would have mistakenly been classified as a
non-family firm according to immediate ownership, is considered a family firm under the
control chain methodology. In this work, we have determined the entire control chain of
each firm and for each year considered in the final sample, without assuming that the
levels of voting rights do not vary throughout that period.
FIGURE 1.- SOL MELIÁ CONTROL CHAIN AS AT 31st DECEMBER, 2003
Sol Meliá, S.A.
Ailemlos, S.L. Listed investmentsof Mediterráneo,
S.L.
Hoteles
Mallorquines
Consolidados, S.A.
Hoteles
Mallorquines
Asociados, S.L.
Hoteles
Mallorquines
Agrupados, S.L.
Majorcan Hotels
Luxembour,
S.A.R.L.
Caja de Ahorros 
del Mediterráneo
Gabriel
Escarrer
Juliá
Rufino 
Calero 
Cuevas
6.94 5.006 27.9 16.34 10.82 5.83
100 100 78.93 78.93 80.93 38.53
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(4) The cross-sectional estimation of discretionary accrual has been used in recent literature on earnings
management (e.g., Gaver et al., 1995; Becker et al.; 1998; DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998; Teoh et al.,
1998a, 1998b; Beneish, 1997; Peasnell et al., 2000; García and Gill, 2007; Monterrey and Sánchez-Segura,
2007).
(5) The modification by Dechow et al. (1995) came about from the consideration that the Jones model assumes
that revenues are non-discretionary; thus, if earnings are managed through discretionary revenues, then the
Jones model will remove part of the managed earnings from the discretionary accrual proxy. In this way, the
model modified by Dechow et al. (1995) considers that, in obtaining discretionary accruals, the entire
variation in credit sales is due to earnings management.
(6) The modification by Kothari et al. (2005) includes the ROA variable in the accrual model, which mitigates
specification errors (indicated by Dechow et al., 1995) in firms displaying extreme values for return of assets
ratio. 
(7) The following industries have been identified from the National Stock Exchange Commission
classification: Oil and Energy, Basic Materials, Manufacturing Industries and Construction, Consumer Goods,
Consumer Services, Real Estate, and finally, Telecommunication and New Market. A minimum of six
observations were required for each sector and year, which is in line with DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994),
Young (1999) and García and Gill (2007).
(8) With the exception of ROA, which by definition is deflated by the total assets at the beginning of the year.
3.2. - Measures of earnings quality
3.2.1. Earnings management 
This work uses discretionary accruals as a proxy of earnings management. Specifically, it
obtains total discretionary accruals using the cross sectional4 discretionary acuals model
suggested by Jones (1991) and modified by Dechow et al. (1995)5 and Kothari et al.
(2005)6. Thus, we first estimate the following regression model in cross section for each
industry7-year combination. 
(Eq. 1)
where ACC are total accruals, defined as change in non-cash current assets (from year t-
1 to year t) minus the change in current liabilities, excluding the variation in financial
debts, and minus amortization and depreciation expense. DREV is change in revenues.
DAR is change in accounts receivables. PPE is the gross level of property, plant and
equipment ROA is return of assets ratio. All the variables are deflated by the value of total
assets at the beginning of the year8.
The absolute value of the residuals of regression for each firm-year observation is the
measure of discretionary accruals. Thus, a low value of discretionary accruals will indicate
high quality of reported earnings. The use of unsigned discretionary accruals is justified
by the absence of a specific theoretical prediction regarding their positive or negative
values (Monterrey and Sánchez-Segura, 2007). Like those authors, we agree with Warfield
et al. (1995) when they indicate that the absolute value of discretionary accruals
determines the extent to which the management intentionally applies certain techniques
to adjust reported figures. 
Thus, to verify the relationship between family control and earnings management, we move
on to the estimation of the following regression model:
Family control and earnings quality
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(Eq. 2)
where AbDACC represents the absolute value of discretionary accruals and FAMVAR
reflects the effect of family control, measured in the following ways. The first is by means
of a dummy variable FAM, which takes a value of 1 when the firm is a family firm and 0
otherwise. The second is through the continuous variable FAMOWN, which represents the
percentage of voting rights held by the ultimate owner when that owner has a family nature.
Finally, as an extension of the analysis of family control, we examine whether the
divergence between the controlling family’s voting and cash flow rights has a negative
impact on earnings quality. To that end, we consider the variable FAMDIV, measured as
the ratio of the controlling family’s voting rights to cash flow rights. By mere definition of
the ratio, FAMDIV is inversely related to the level of divergence between the voting and
cash flow rights in the hands of the controlling family.
Furthermore, a set of control variables used in earlier literature has been included in the
model. Thus, OWN represents the percentage of voting rights in the hands of the ultimate
owner, LEV captures the effect of debt by means of the relationship between the book value
of the financial debt to total assets at the beginning of the year, SIZE represents the size
effect as the logarithm of operating revenue at the beginning of the year, ROA is return of
assets ratio, MTB reflects the effect of growth opportunities by means of the market-to-book
ratio, INST captures the effect of the control exercised by institutional investors as the
percentage of the voting rights held by those shareholders, LOSS is a dummy variable with
a value of 1 if the firm reports losses and 0 otherwise and is included to reflect the effect of
the risk of insolvency, AGE is the effect of the firm’s age, YEARt is a dummy variable
controlling for year effects. INDi is a dummy variable controlling for industry effects. 
3.2.2. Predictability of cash flows
In order to obtain the measure related to the ability of the components of current earnings
to predict future cash flows, we followed the methodology applied by Dechow et al. (1998),
Barth et al. (2001), Cohen (2004) and Ali et al. (2007). More exactly, we use the residuals
obtained from the following regression of future cash flows from operations on prior
period’s earnings components9: 
(Eq. 3)
C. Bona, J. Pérez y D. Santana
(9) We have chosen not to provide a breakdown of the total accruals (ACC) in the variables (Ali et al., 2007)
since we are solely interested in regression residuals.
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where CFO is the cash flow from operations, measured as the difference between earnings
and the total accruals, deflated by total assets at the beginning of the year. 
As in the case of discretionary accruals, the regression is estimated for each industry-year
combination. The absolute value of the residuals obtained (AbPC) is the measure of
reporting quality. These residuals reflect the amount of future cash flows from operations
that are not related to current components of earnings. Thus, the lower absolute values of
this variable, the greater the ability of the current components of earnings to predict future
cash flows (higher quality).
The relationship between family control and predictability of cash flows will be tested with
the following logistic regression model:
(Eq. 4)
where QUALITY is a dummy variable that takes the value of  1 if AbPC is less than the
median value of AbPC, and 0 otherwise. 
3.3. - Sample selection
The sample was selected from 111 non financial firms listed on the Spanish stock market
at the end of 2003. Six firms were eliminated from the final sample since they were not
registered in Spain and one company was also excluded since trading was suspended due
to a liquidation process. Two additional firms were not considered since they did not
provide at least 3 observations during the period 1997-2003. After identifying the control
chain of the remaining 102 firms for the seven years under study, twelve firms with no
ultimate owner10 were eliminated. 
Family control and earnings quality
(10) By eliminating those firms with widely-held ownership, the final sample comprises only those firms in
which there is an ultimate owner (family or non-family). Thus, we will obtain more robust results since the
agency conflict between majority and minority shareholders will predominate in all the firms, and this is
one of the central points of this work. However, the results would not be significant changed if the 102
firms are contemplated.
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Family firms 47.37 40.00 42.67 44.58 44.94 41.11 41.11
Non-family firms 52.63 60.00 57.33 55.42 55.06 58.89 58.89
Total number of firms 57 65 75 83 89 90 90
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RESULTS
4.1. Descriptive analysis
With regard to the family nature of the ultimate owner, Table 1 displays the weighting of
family firms during the period 1997-2003. It shows that, in 2003, 41.11% of the analysed
listed firms were controlled by family groups. These results are in line with the theoretical
approaches found in the works of Bebchuck (1999) and Burkart et al. (2003), and also with
the empirical results of the studies by La Porta et al. (1999) and Faccio and Lang (2002).
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TABLE 1.- PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE FAMILY NATURE 
OF THE CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
A firm is defined as a family firm when the ultimate owner is a family or an individual and their voting rights
are represented on the board. 
The sample comprises 90 non-financial Spanish firms listed between 1997 and 2003.
The descriptive statistics, together with the correlation matrix of the variables, are
presented in Table 2. This table shows that the level of concentration of voting rights in
the hands of the controlling family (42.69%) exceeds the average for the total number of
firms irrespective of the controlling owner’s nature (38%). Furthermore, it can be seen
that family firms separate their voting and cash flow rights through the use of pyramid
structures, since the average of the variable FAMDIV obtains a value of 0.901. On the
other hand, the presence of institutional ownership among the firms analyzed is notable
since the average value of the variable INST is approximately 13% of the voting rights
in the hands of institutional investors. Moreover, we should stress that most firms do not
report losses since the variable LOSS has an average value of 0.06 and a median of zero.
Finally, and with regard to the data reflected in the correlation matrix, we did not
observe high correlation values between the explanatory variables; this enables us to
state that the existence of multicolinearity problems in the specification of the
regression models is improbable.
4
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4.2. Family control and earnings quality 
To analyse the incidence of family control on the level of discretionary accruals, we
perform a set of ordinary least squares regressions. To avoid the possible influence of
extreme values, we have eliminated those observations for which studentized residuals of
the estimated equations exceeded an absolute value of 2. The statistical significance of the
coefficients is based on the Huber-White covariance matrix, which is robust for
heteroskedasticity.
The estimated regressions of Equation 2 (Eq. 2) using ordinary least squares correspond
to Models 1, 2 and 3. In Model 1, we include an attribute of family control, a dummy
variable that measures the family nature of the ultimate owner (FAM), and in Model 2 we
consider another dimension of family control, a continuous variable that reflects that
ultimate owner’s voting rights (FAMOWN). Moreover, the variable FAMDIV has been
included in Model 3 in order to analyse the impact of the divergence between the
controlling family’s voting and cash flow rights on discretionary accruals. In Model 1, the
significant negative coefficient on the variable FAM is consistent with family firms using
a lower level of discretionary accruals compared to non-family firms. Besides this, the
coefficient on the variable FAMOWN in Model 2 is also negative and statistically
significant, which suggests that the higher the percentage of voting rights in the hands of
the controlling family, the lower the level of discretionary accruals. Furthermore, the
coefficient on the variable FAMDIV is not statistically significant in Model 3. 
C. Bona, J. Pérez y D. Santana
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TABLE 3.- FAMILY CONTROL AND EARNINGS QUALITY.
AbDACC QUALITY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FAM -0.012* 0.930***
(-1.76) (2.95)
FAMOWN -0.0002* 0.016**
(-1.68) (2.44)
FAMDIV -0.009 0.896***
(-1.22) (2.76)
OWN -0.009 0.0001 -0.0002 0.006 -0.001 0.006
(-0.08) (0.74) (-0.18) (1.15) (-0.23) (1.19)
LOSS 0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.439 -0.59 -0.42
(0.13) (0.30) (0.14) (-0.87) (-1.17) (-0.84)
CFO 0.001 -0.002 0.002 -2.23 -2.06 -2.24
(0.04) (-0.09) (0.07) (-1.57) (-1.45) (-1.58)
AGE 0.0001 0.0009 -0.0001 -0.010* -0.01** -0.009*
(0.02) (0.09) (-0.11) (-2.03) (-2.06) (-1.88)
MTB 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** -0.0001 0.001 -0.002
(2.24) (2.21) (2.32) (0.05) (0.04) (-0.06)
LEV 0.017* 0.016* 0.015* -0.606 -0.55 -0.598
(1.83) (1.78) (1.68) (-1.36) (-1.23) (-1.33)
SIZE -0.006*** -0.006*** 0.006*** 0.149* 0.114 0.153*
(-3.05) (-2.92) (-2.92) (1.73) (1.36) (1.76)
ROA 0.008 0.014 0.010 -2.27 -2.75 -2.23
(0.19) (0.30) (0.21) (-1.13) (-1.38) (-1.11)
INST -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0001 0.012 0.008 0.011
(-0.37) (-1.29) (-0.07) (1.33) (0.95) (1.18)
Industry  effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.096*** 0.098*** 0.093*** 1.243 2.12 (1.51)
(2.96) (3.12) (2.83) (0.86) 1.14 (0.79)
R2 adjusted 0.13 0.13 0.13
F 3.86*** 3.85*** 3.76***
Wald Test 79.75*** 76.82*** 78.58***
Log likelihood -231.83 -233.29 -232.42
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.14 0.14
AbDACC, the absolute value of discretionary accruals. FAM, a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when
the firm is a family firm, and 0 otherwise. QUALITY, a dummy variable whose value is 1 when AbPC is below
the median, and 0 otherwise (AbPC is the measure of future cash flows that are not related to the components
of earnings of the current year). FAMOWN, is the percentage of voting rights in the hands of the controlling
family. FAMDIV, is the divergence between the voting and cash flow rights in the hands of the controlling
family. OWN, represents the percentage of voting rights held by the ultimate owner. LOSS, is the dummy
variable with a value of 1 if the firm has reported losses, and 0 otherwise. CFO, is cash flow from operations,
measured as the difference between earnings before extraordinary items and the total accruals, deflated by total
assets at the beginning of the year. AGE, is the firm’s age. MTB, is the market-to-book ratio. LEV, is the
relationship between the book value of the financial debt and total assets at the beginning of the year. SIZE, is
the natural logarithm of revenues at the beginning of the year. ROA, is the return on assets. INST, is the
percentage of voting rights held by institutional shareholders. YEARt is a dummy variable controlling for year
effects. INDi is a dummy variable controlling for industry effects.
The sample comprises 90 non financial Spanish firms listed between 1997 and 2003.
***,**,*: Statistically significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively. 
In parentheses, t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm.
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To analyse further the incidence of family control on the second dimension of earnings
quality considered in the study, predictability of cash flows, we perform a set of ordinary
least squares regressions. The estimated regressions of Equation 4 (Eq. 4) using ordinary
least squares correspond to Models 4, 5 and 6. In Model 4, the coefficient on the variable
FAM is positive and significant, showing a greater ability of the components of current
earnings to predict future cash flows in family firms than in non-family firms. As Model 5
shows predictability of cash flows will also increase as the controlling family’s percentage
of voting rights increases since the coefficient on the variable FAMOWN is positive and
statistically significant. Therefore, the results support Hypothesis Ha, which proposes that
family control has a positive impact on earnings quality. Finally, in Model 6 the coefficient
on the variable FAMDIV is positive and statistically significant. This result implies an
increase in earnings predictability as the divergence between the controlling family’s
voting and cash flow rights decreases, since in this setting the controlling family’s
incentives to obtain private benefits will be reduced.
With regard to the coefficients on the control variables we must point out that when they
are statistically significant, their signs are consistent with previous literature (e.g., Becker
et al., 1998; Chung and Kallapur, 2003; Wang, 2006; Ali et al., 2007). Thus, the market-
to-book ratio (MTB) and debt (LEV) have a positive impact on the level of discretionary
accruals, while size (SIZE) has a negative incidence.
Robustness
In order to check the robustness of the results, several alternative tests were carried out.
First of all, we use a less restrictive definition of a family firm. In that respect, we adopt
the definition by La Porta et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang
(2002), who consider a family firm a company in which the ultimate owner is an individual
or family, with no requirement for that ownership to be represented on the board. Using
this new definition, we redefine the variables that are the object of the empirical test and
label them FAMbis, FAMOWNbis and FAMDIVbis. As the various models show (Table 4),
the results are consistent with those previously obtained. Therefore, they are not sensitive
to the alternative definition of a family firm. Moreover, in this case, a statistically
significant coefficient is obtained for variable FAMDIVbis in Models 9 and 12.
Finally, we have run regressions to assess the effect of controlling family on the
predictability of cash flows using the continuous variable AbPC, instead of the dummy
variable QUALITY. In this way, the estimated regressions considered the two alternative
definitions of a family firm. The results do not differ from those previously obtained. 
C. Bona, J. Pérez y D. Santana
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TABLE 4.- FAMILY CONTROL AND EARNINGS QUALITY. ROBUSTNESS
AbDACC QUALITY
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
FAMbis -0.016** 0.915***
(-2.32) (2.92)
FAMOWNbis -0.0003* 0.016**
(-1.86) (2.41)
FAMDIVbis -0.01* 0.820**
(-1.68) (2.56)
OWN -0.005 0.0001 -0.0001 0.007 -0.001 0.007
(-0.04) (0.84) (-0.15) (1.24) (-0.20) (1.28)
LOSS 0.008 0.003 0.001 -0.41 -0.58 -0.42
(0.07) (0.30) (0.09) (-0.82) (-1.16) (-0.84)
CFO -0.008 -0.004 0.0007 -2.18 -2.04 -2.21
(-0.03) (-0.13) (0.02) (-1.54) (-1.44) (-1.56)
AGE 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.01** -0.01** -0.01*
(0.13) (0.13) (-0.05) (-2.09) (-2.07) (-1.91)
MTB 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** -0.0005 0.001 -0.002
(2.19) (2.19) (2.30) (-0.05) (0.04) (-0.05)
LEV 0.018* 0.017* 0.016* -0.58 -0.54 -0.56
(1.96) (1.83) (1.77) (-1.32) (-1.21) (-1.25)
SIZE -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 0.152* 0.115 0.150*
(-3.22) (-2.95) (-3.04) (1.75) (1.37) (1.72)
ROA 0.004 0.013 0.007 -2.20 -2.73 -2.22
(0.11) (0.29) (0.15) (-1.09) (-1.37) (-1.11)
INST -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0003 0.011 0.008 0.009
(-0.55) (-0.27) (-0.17) (1.22) (0.91) (1.00)
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.101*** 0.085*** 0.097*** 1.218 2.49* 1.21
(3.13) (2.72) (2.95) (0.84) (1.78) (0.84)
R2 adjusted 0.14 0.13 0.13
F 4.00*** 3.88*** 3.83***
Wald test 79.57*** 76.67*** 77.45***
Log likelihood -231.92 -233.37 -232.98
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.14 0.14
AbDACC, the absolute value of discretionary accruals. FAM, a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when
the firm is a family firm, and 0 otherwise. AbPC, is the measure of future cash flows that are not related to
the components of earnings of the current year. FAMOWN, is the percentage of voting rights in the hands of
the controlling owner. FAMDIV, is the divergence between the voting and cash flow rights in the hands of the
controlling family. OWN, represents the percentage of voting rights held by the ultimate owner. LOSS, is the
dummy variable with a value of 1 if the firm has reported losses, and 0 otherwise. CFO, is cash flow from
operations, measured as the difference between earnings before extraordinary items and the total accruals,
deflated by total assets at the beginning of the year. AGE, is the firm’s age. MTB, is the market-to-book ratio.
LEV, is the relationship between the book value of the financial debt and total assets at the beginning of the
year. SIZE, is the natural logarithm of revenues at the beginning of the year. ROA, is the return on assets.
INST, is the percentage of voting rights held by institutional shareholders. YEARt is a dummy variable
controlling for year effects. INDi is a dummy variable controlling for industry effects.
***,**,*: Statistically significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively. 
In parentheses, t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm.
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CONCLUSIONS
This work shows that the family nature of the ultimate owner affects earnings quality in a
context where the salient agency conflict is the expropriation of minority shareholders by
controlling owners. In such a setting, the interests of external investors are scarcely
protected by the legal system, and the ownership structure is characterized by a high
concentration of voting rights in the hands of the controlling family, but also by the use of
structures that enable this kind of shareholder to separate voting and cash flow rights. 
The study shows that the family nature of the controlling shareholder entails lower levels
of discretional accruals, and greater cash flows predictability. Furthermore, the controlling
family’s level of voting rights has a positive impact on earnings quality. These results are
robust to the use of the different definitions of the family firm and consistent with the long-
investment horizons of family firms. This means that family firms are conceived as an asset
to be transferred to the heirs, rather than wealth to be consumed during the owner’s
lifetime. The evidence is in line with that obtained for US firms by Wang (2006) and Ali
et al. (2007). Thus, the impact of the positive features of family control on earnings quality
seems to persist in a context where a few shareholders concentrate a high proportion of
voting rights. 
The results of this work also show that, in a family-controlled firm, the divergence between
the ultimate owner´s voting and cash flow rights through the use of pyramid structures
increases the incentives of the controlling family to obtain private benefits at the expense
of the minority shareholder. This fact creates incentives for the controlling family to alter
accounting numbers in order to avoid close monitoring by outsiders, all which implies a
reduction in earnings quality. So the negative effect usually found in previous literature
regarding the divergence between the ultimate shareholder´s voting and cash flow rights
also extends to family firms.
Finally, at a time when Spanish accounting regulations are undergoing changes, the results
obtained in this study are of special importance since they clearly show the need to
consider the incentives associated with the nature of the controlling shareholders as
important determinants of accounting quality. We also consider that the results obtained
may be extended to other countries of continental Europe, where the paradigm of corporate
governance is similar to that in Spain. 
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